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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-RAGIAL
SEGREGATION FOR THE PURPOSES OF EDUCATION.*
This was an action for mandamus to compel the curators of the
University of Missouri to admit the relator, a member of the colored
race, to the law school. Under Missouri statutese Lincoln University
was provided to give negroes facilities equal to those given the whites
at the University of Missouri. It was further provided that where the
curriculum of Lincoln failed to equal that given the whites, applying
negroes should be sent to an institution in an adjoining state, where
their tuition would be paid, and where such discrimination did not
exist. Held: that the statute did not violate the "equal protection"
clause of the Constitution, and that mandamus would not issue. State
e'x rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S. W. (2d) 7S3 (Mo. 1937).
It has been universally held that segregation is constitutional when
equal facilities are provided for the colored, "while it may be, and proba-
bly is, opposed to the spirit of the (Fourteenth Amendment), still it is
not obnoxious to (the) letter".2 "Equality (does) not (mean) identi-
ty",3 and, "civil rights do not mean social rights".4 These observations
serve to point out the attitude of the courts, as does the statement of
the New York court that "we cannot see why the establishment of
separate institutions for the education and benefit of different races
should be held any more to imply the inferiority of one race than that
of the other .. .5
Due to the delicacy of the situation, the United States Supreme
Court has followed a laissez faire policy, as voiced by Justice Harlan:6
". .. while all admit the benefits and burdens of public taxa-
tion must be shared without discrimination against any class on
account of their race, the education of the people in schools main-
tained by the state taxation is a matter belonging to the state, and
any Interference on the part of federal authority with the manage-
ment of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear
and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law
of the land."
* This note was written immediately before the Supreme Court
decision was handed down on the instant case on appeal. That decision
settled the legal problem involved, but left unfortunately unaffected
those practical problems which are herein set out. For this reason the
note is being published in its original form.
I Mo. Stat. Ann., Secs. 9216, 9618, 9622, 9345.
2 State, ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 8 Am. Rep. 713
(1872).
3 State, ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S. W. (2d) 783, 788 (1937).
4 McFarland, Tax Collector, v. Goins, 96 Miss. 67, 50 So. 493 (1909).
5 King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 45 Am. Rep. 232 (1883).
4 Cummings v. County Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
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The reluctance of the Court to commit itself on the question has
discouraged appeals from the state courts, with the result that there
are few opinions by the Court on this subject, and little is found in
them to prick out the pale, past which the state legislatures may not go.
It is well settled that to permit segregation the state must provide
equal facilities for the colored people. The California court placed its
finger upon the true doctrine when it said:
7
".. . the exclusion of colored children from schools where white
children attend as pupils, cannot be supported .. . except where
separate schools are actually maintained for the education of
colored children; and that such separate schools be maintained in
fact, all children ... whether white or colored, have an equal right
to become pupils at any common school organized under the law
of the state ..."
These separate schools must be equal in equipment,8 and although the
fact that they are less accessible won't breach the constitutional require-
ments,' if they are so situated as to be dangerous to reach, there is a
breach of constitutional duty.0
The question raised by the instant case would seem to be whether
or not a state may, by 'proper' legislation, substitute for the accepted
separate school provided by it, the facilities of another state with tuition
paid, and thus satisfy the "equal protection" clause of the Constitution.
In another case" the question has arisen under substantially the same
set of facts and statutory provisions." In that case the Maryland court
held that the statute involved was unconstitutional and In contraven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying:
". . . the requirement of equal treatment would seem to be
clearly enough one of equal treatment in respect to any one facility
or opportunity furnished to its citizens, rather than of a balance in
state bounty to be struck from the expenditure and provisions for
each race generally. We take it to be clear ... that a state could
not be rendered free to maintain a law school exclusively for whites
by maintaining at equal cost a school of technology for colored
students... (As) no separate law school is provided by this state
for colored students, the main question in the case is whether the
separation can be maintained, and negroes excluded from the
7 Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 17 Am. Rep. 405 (1874).
8Muddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121, 55 Am. Rep. 540 (1885); Williams v.
Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908); Crawford v. Dis-
trict School Board, 68 Ore. 388, 137 Pac. 217 (1913).
' Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1891).
"Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 Pac. 216 (1908).
"Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
2The relator in the Maryland case had to travel the distance
between Washington, D. C., and Baltimore, Md., to attend school. The
court in that case pointed out that he would be denied the advantages
of the special instruction in the law of his state, as it was taught at the
state institution there; and also that he would be denied the opportunity
to attend the courts of his state so that he might become conversant
with their procedural method. In that case the statute also failed to
provide an amount sufficiently large to care for all the applicants, but
the court's language indicated that this made no difference in the deci-
sion it would reach if such had not been the case.
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present school, by reason of equality of treatment furnished the
latter in scholarships for studying outside the state, where law
schools are open to negroes."
The Missouri court, in refusing to follow this case on which the
plaintiff strongly relied, laid much emphasis upon the similarity of the
distances traveled, the cost of living in adjoining states, and the high
standing of the universities in question.1 It is doubtful nevertheless
whether or not this answers the accepted doctrine that, although it is
not the duty of the states to give their citizens an education by common
schools, where such is undertaken, the Constitution requires' ".. . . the
legislature to furnish a system of common schools where each and
every child may be educated; not that all must be educated in any one
school, but that it shall provide or furnish a school or schools where
each and all may have the advantages granted by that instrument."
Does this provision for an education in another state meet the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment? Or, as the cases are in
accord that separation is permissible so long as equal facilities are
afforded within the state, does the provision for "equal" facilities out-
side the state, with tuition paid, also meet the requirements of "equal
protection"? Since this question has not as yet been answered by the
United States Supreme Court, it is pardonable to suggest a few of the
practical problems which are crying for recognition.
There are three possible solutions to the problem: (1) construction
of a separate school for the colored, (2) intermingling of the two races
at the school reserved for use by the whites, and (3) the providing of
"equal" facilities at the institution of another state. Statistics show
that there are so few applicants for an education of this type as to
make it impractical to operate a separate school. Sentiment in the
South (bulwarked by the written opinions of Northern courts dealing
with the same subject)" is so strongly against the mixing of the two
races that to grant the negro admission to the school for whites would
in effect deprive him, or the large majority of his race, from such an
education at the state's expense, because of the difficulties and obstruc-
tions that would be placed in his way by his fellow students, if not by
his professors. 7 On the other hand, under the provisions of the instant
" The Maryland court, supra n. 11, also discussed these considera-
tions, but refused to be swayed by them. It evidently considered the
question to be a more fundamental one than a mere physical question
as to distances, etc.
U People, ex rel. Cisco v. School Board of Bourough of Queens,
N. Y. C., 61 N. Y. S. 330, 65 N. E. 81 (1899).
113 S. W. (2d) 783, 791.
' "The attempt to enforce social intimacy and intercourse between
the races by legal enactments, would probably tend only to embitter
the prejudices . . . which exist between them, and produce an evil
Instead of a good result." King v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438, 44S,
45 Am. Rep. 232 (1883).
"TAs indicative of the extremes to which this feeling may go is
the fact that in the history of the United States Military Academy,
West Point, only two colored men have succeeded in graduating; and,
as an interesting sidelight, the second was the son of the first.
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statute, a substantial equality is afforded the negro in another state
where unpleasantries need not be suffered. But, accepting this as a
solution, we are still confronted with the dilemma which arises when a
state more deeply southern, as Florida, attempts to enact a similar
statute. In Missouri the facilities of the adjacent state lend more to
the reasonableness of "equality", than in the case where the colored
applicant would find it necessary to traverse several states and hundreds
of miles to acquire the benefits offered him by the state.
To the crusader, acceptance of the doctrine set out in the instant
case may seem a flagrant violation of the "equal protection" guaranteed
citizens under the Federal Constitution, but to one more concerned
about the best interests of the colored race, the solution suggests itself
as a sane and acceptable answer to a difficult situation.
JOHN B. BRECKINImOE.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER WITH MALICE-NEGLIGENCE
The defendant, who had drunk five bottles of beer and was admit-
tedly not sober when he began drinking beer, drove out of town at
sixty miles per hour, swerved completely across a nine-foot highway
to his left, striking and killing two boys walking eight feet off the
pavement in the weed growth. Held, that evidence establishing these
facts was sufficient for the jury to find the driver guilty of murder
with "nalice". Coclcrell v. State, ...... Tex. Cr. R. ..- , 117 S. W. (2nd)
1105 (1938).
Texas has by statute created four degrees of culpable homicide:
(1) Negligent homicide in the first degree, (2) Negligent homicide In
the second degree, (3) Murder without malice, and (4) Murder with
malice.'
Without discussing what other degrees the defendant in this case
might have been convicted of, it is pertinent to see wherein the court
was justified in finding him guilty of murder with malice. It is to be
presumed, as the defendant was prosecuted under the general law gov-
erning homicide, with the intent "to prove, if possible, a killing with
malice," that instructions were properly submitted to the jury.2 Since
it was held that the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding
the defendant guilty of murder with "malice", the important considera-
tion of what constitutes "malice aforethought" or "malice" in this case
is of primary concern.
In determining what constitutes malice here, the court cited and
followed the case of Banks v. State, in which it had been said that
"Malice may be toward a group of persons as well as toward an indi-
vidual. It may exist without former grudges or antecedent menaces.
The intentional doing of any wrongful act in such manner and under
such circumstances as that the death of a human being may result
therefrom is malice."' Collins v. State' decided malice to be "a state
